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Moreover, the emphasis of contemporary research has been almost completely shifted from the study of the causes of inequality to the study of the facts and of their consequences for various aspects of economic activity, particularly consumer behavior.
However, the facts of income inequality do not speak for themselves in statistical frequency distributions. The facts must be recognized in the statistical constructs and interpreted from them. Perhaps the most important conclusion to be drawn from research into the influence of income distribution on consumption is that the effects of inequality depend upon its causes.' Thus factors associated with observed inequality must be taken into account before the data can be put to any use. A more general and traditional answer, given by Pigou himself, is that incomedetermining factors other than ability intervene to distort the relation between ability and income. Thus, given a definition of the former independent of income, the relation between the two can be discerned only in subgroups homogeneous with respect to all other factors. Ability is relegated to a residual role, and the emphasis is shifted to other factors. Pigou pointed to the distribution of property as the most important of the other factors. This position resolves the paradox, but it is not a theory of income distribution until the other factors are built into models with predictive properties.
Curiously enough, the one factor consistently selected for such constructive purposes in the recent literature is "chance," a concept as difficult to define as "ability." The earliest and basic version of the stochastic models is that of Gibrat.5 Its logical construction is as follows: Start with some distribution of income, with mean Mo and variance Vo, and let individual incomes be subjected to a random increase or decrease over time as a result of "chance" or "luck." Let the variance of the annual changes in income in year t be Vt, and let those changes be uncorrelated with the levels of income on which they impinge. Then the variance of the income distribution at time (t + n) will be n Vn = VO+ E Vt. With n increasing without bounds, any Vt becomes very small in comparison with 2tvt, and similarly VO becomes small in comparison with Vn. Under these conditions, probability theory guarantees that in time the distribution of income will approach normality, regardless of the form of the initial distribution. 
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Personal income distributions are not normally or symmetrically distributed, but the distribution of logarithms of income is rather symmetric and in a rough way approximates normality. The process of "random shock" just described generates a log-normal distribution if applied to the logarithms of income rather than to income itself. Thus the proper assumption to be made is that the random shock consists of relative or percentage, rather than absolute, income changes, which are independent of income levels. This is Gibrat's "law of proportionate effect."
Kalecki has pointed out a serious defect in Gibrat's approach.6 The model implies that, as time goes by, aggregate income inequality increases because each subsequent random shock adds a term to the sum on the right side of the ex- Unless we assign specific interpretations to the "chance" factor, it is difficult to see how the stochastic models increase our understanding of the processes underlying the formation of personal income distributions. If the "chance" factor is to be understood as a net effect of all kinds of causes, this approach is an admission of defeat in the efforts to gain insight into systematic factors affecting the distribution of income. Moreover, the operational scope of the stochastic models has not kept pace with the increasing empirical knowledge about the multidimensional structure of the personal income distribution. With few exceptions,9 the sole purpose of the models is to rationalize a presumed mathematical form of the aggregate.
From the economist's point of view, perhaps the most unsatisfactory feature of the stochastic models, which they share with most other models of personal income distribution, is that they shed no light on the economics of the distribution process. Non-economic factors undoubtedly play an important role in the distribution of incomes. Yet, unless one denies the relevance of rational optimizing behavior to economic activity in general, it is difficult to see how the factor of individual choice can be disregarded in analyzing personal income distribution, which can scarcely be independent of economic activity.
The starting point of an economic analysis of personal income distribution must be an exploration of the implications of the theory of rational choice. In a recent article" Friedman has pointed out two ways in which individual choice can affect the personal income distribution. One, around which Friedman built his model, is related to differences in tastes for risk and hence to choices among alternatives differing in the probability distribution of income they promise. Friedman has shown that such a model is, no less than the others, capable of reproducing the more outstanding features of the aggregative distribution of income. The other, and more familiar, implication of rational choice is the formation of income differences that are required to compensate for various advantages and disadvantages attached to the receipt of the incomes. This principle, so eloquently stated by Adam Smith, has become a "commonplace of
XWhat follows is an attempt to cast one important aspect of this compensation principle into an operational model that provides insights into some features of the aggregative personal income distribution and into a number of decompositions of it which recent empirical research has made accessible. The aspect chosen concerns differences in training among members of the labor force.
II. A SIMPLE MODEL
Assume that all individuals have identical abilities and equal opportunities to enter any occupation. Occupations differ, however, in the amount of training they require. Training takes time, and each additional year of it postpones the individual's earnings for another year, generally reducing the span of his earning life. For convenience, assume that a year of training reduces earning life by exactly one year.l2 If individuals with different amounts of training are to be compensated for the costs of training, the present values of life-earnings must be equalized at the time a choice of occupation is made. If we add a provisional assumption that the flow of income receipts is steady during the working life, it is possible to estimate the extent of compensatory income differences due to differences in the cost of training.'3
The cost of training depends upon the length of the training period in two ways. First and foremost is the deferral of earnings for the period of training; second is the cost of educational services and equipment, such as tuition and books, but not living expenses.
For simplicity, consider the case in which expenses for educational services It is easily seen that kn, n-d is (a) larger than unity, (b) a positive function of r, and (c) a negative function of 1. In other words, as would be expected, (a) people with more training command higher annual pay; (b) the difference between earnings of persons differing by d years of training is larger, the higher the rate at which future income is discounted, that is, the greater the sacrifice involved in the act of income postponement; (c) the difference is larger, the shorter the general span of working life, since the costs of training must be recouped over a relatively shorter period.
These conclusions are quite obvious. For example, if average earnings of high-school graduates are $4,000 and the annual expenses of a college education are $1,000, then to the compensatory income differences due to the deferral of income for 4 years (k4 -1) we must add (1,000/4,000) (k4 -1) to compensate for the cost of tuition. This increases the differences by 25 per cent (see my un- persion in the amount of training implies that aggregative skewness is greater than it would be in its absence. In particular, even if it were true that abilities are distributed in a way which, ceteris paribus, implies a symmetric distribution of earnings, positive skewness would appear in that distribution as soon as choice of training was admitted into the model. Thus Pigou's paradox would persist even in the absence of the institutional factors that he invoked to explain it.
EXTENSION OF THE MODEL
Primarily for mathematical convenience, I have expressed differences in training in terms of definite time periods spent on formal schooling. However, the process of learning a trade or profession does not end with the completion of school. Experience on the job is often the most essential part of the learning process.
Just as formal training can be measured by the length of time spent at school, the other part of the training process-experience-can be introduced into the theoretical model in terms of the amount of time spent on the job. When this is done, "intra-occupational" patterns of income variation, previously abstracted from, must emerge. By definition, the amount of formal training is the same for each member of an occupation. However, the productive efficiency or quality of performance on the job is a function of formal training plus experience, both measured in time units; hence it is a function of age. We are thus forced to relax another assumption, previously adopted for convenience, namely, that earnings are of the same size in each period of an individual's earning life.
Clearly, as more skill and experience are acquired with passage of time, earnings rise. In later years aging often brings about a deterioration of productive performance and hence a decline in earnings, particularly in jobs where physical effort or motor skill is involved. Thus, in general, the "life-cycle" of earnings exhibits an inverted U-shaped pattern of growth and decline typical of many other growth curves.
We have already seen that differences in formal training result in compensatory differences in levels of earnings as between different "occupations," the latter defined in terms of length of formal training. This compensatory principle must, of course, also remain valid when lifepaths of earnings are sloped. An important new question arises: What specific assumption is to be made about differences between these slopes in the different occupations, since these in turn imply differences in the dispersion of earnings within the occupational groups?
Casual observation suggests that patterns of age-changes in productive performance differ among occupations as well as among individuals. The exploration of such differences is a well-established subject of study in developmental psychology. A survey of broad, rather tentative findings in this field indicates that (a) growth in productive performance is more pronounced and prolonged in jobs of higher levels of skill and complexity; (b) growth is less pronounced and decline sets in earlier in manual work than in other pursuits; and (c) the more capable and the more educated individuals tend to grow faster and longer than others in the performance of the same task.'8
These findings suggest that experience influences productivity more strongly in jobs that normally require more training. ing implies that the growth of ear also greater.
These considerations point to the replacement of the previous assumption of horizontal life-paths of earnings with the assumption that the slopes of time-paths of earnings vary directly with the amount of formal training, that is, with "occupational rank."
IMPLICATIONS
In brief, we are led to the following conclusion: Differences in training result in differences in levels of earnings among ''occupations" as well as in differences in slopes of life-paths of earnings among occupations. The differences are systematic: the higher the "occupational rank," the higher the level of earnings and the steeper the life-path of earnings.
Two implications of basic importance for empirical investigation follow immediately from these findings.
1. Since, under our assumptions, intraoccupational differentials are a function of age only, the statement that lifepaths of earnings are steeper for the more highly trained groups of workers means that income differences between any two members of such a group differing in age are greater than income differences between their contemporaries in an occupational group requiring less training.
In itself, this conclusion does not necessarily imply a systematic difference in income dispersion within the two groups. It points to age distributions within the respective groups as another factor that must be considered. Clearly, if one group consists of members with very similar ages and in another there is a wide range of ages, there may be less income dispersion in the first group, even though its life-path of earnings may be steeper than that of the second group.
Observe, however, that such a phenomenon is in part ruled out by our previous assumptions. Membership in an occupational group was defined by the number of years of the individual's formal training, which is determined once for all by the calculus of occupational choice (the equalization of present values) before entry into the labor force. In other words, if we define "vertical occupational mobility" as the movement from a group with, say, n -d years of training to a group with n years of training, this is, by definition, impossible after the training period is over. If, in addition, secular occupational shifts are abstracted from, occupational distribution must be alike in all age groups after all training periods are over; a fortiori, age distributions must be alike in all occupational groups.'9 With this qualification, the direct translation of slopes of life-paths of earnings into patterns of income dispersion is achieved: dispersion must increase with "occupational rank." 2. Now consider income recipients classified into separate age groups. In our model, income differences within each age group are due to differences in the occupational characteristics of its 19 Actually, the assumptions need not be so rigid, as a certain amount of dissimilarity in age distributions will not affect the systematic effects of differences in the steepness of life-paths on intragroup dispersion. Indeed, 1950 Census data indicate that the dissimilarity is rather small among broad occupational groups when comparisons are restricted to the ages between 25 and 65: members. The income differences corresponding to those occupational categories, however, increase with age. Lifepatterns of earnings are not parallel; their divergence becomes more pronounced with added years of experience, so that income dispersion increases as we move from younger to older age groups. TSjUS > T'S'/U'S'. That is, percentage differences and hence the relative dispersion of earnings increase as we move from a younger to an older "occupationmix."
We may now return to the aggregative income distribution and explore the implications for the total of the hypothesis about patterns of income in component groups.
First, it is obvious that the addition of "intra-occupational" differences to the "interoccupational" differences increases aggregate inequality. Moreover, "inter- My model provides specifications which insure that a merger produces positive skewness in the aggregate. The aggregative skewness was already implied by the simple model. In that form, however, income dispersion within occupations was implicitly assumed to be zero. But if its existence is admitted, patterns of "intra-occupational" dispersion might easily affect the aggregative, positive skewness previously derived. This would be the case, for example, if dispersion within less trained groups were systematically and considerably greater than that within more highly trained groups. Geometrically, this would mean shortening the right tail of the aggrega- The translation is necessarily imperfect, in the sense that an exact empirical representation of theoretical concepts is seldom possible, available, or even desirable. For example, the relevant income differences in a given annual income distribution are those among individuals differing in age and not those due to the aging of the same individuals. While the theoretical concepts of training and compensation thus involve a longitudinal view of individual income, they must be brought to bear on cross-sectional data.
The discrepancy between the dynamic concept and the cross-sectional measure Unfortunately, data fulfilling all these requirements are practically non-existent. I was forced, therefore, to use data with varying definitions of income and income recipient. The extent to which the measures deviate from the requirements must be kept in mind as possible sources of discrepancy between theory and fact. When occupation, rather than education, is used as a classificatory principle, the occupational groups must be ranked with respect to the amount of training they presuppose. With broad occupational groups, the vertical ordering from unskilled to highly skilled groups as shown in census tabulations is reasonably appropriate for our purposes. By and large, skill is an end-product of training, and the occupational ranks roughly follow the levels of education and of earnings in the groups. Table 115 , p. 236). A more appropriate estimate is that of 11 years obtained from occupational data (see n. 12 above) as the difference between the length of working life of professional and technical groups and the least-trained laborers, which is interpreted as the number of years of income postponement. These occupational groups are approximately coextensive with the lowest and highest deciles of the occupational distribution; hence the 5th and 95th percentiles used in my measures correspond to their median positions. Since the highest schooling classification in the census data is 16 years or more, the lowest for our purposes is 5-7 years, and the middle figure is 12. Income figures by age for these three training levels were shown in Fig. 2 . The discount rate was conservatively put at 4 per cent and the length of working life of unskilled workers at 51 years (cf. n. 12).
t Actual measures are computed from the distribution in Table 1 . Unfortunately, that distribution includes males who worked part-time (though during the full period). This factor tends to impart a downward bias to "actual" skewness. A rough correction for this bias is achieved by eliminating all earnings below $1,500 (col. 2) and below $2,000 (col. 3), even though this may result in an upward bias. of earnings of fully employed workers in 1949 (Table 1) . From the comparison in Fig. 2 were obtained by shifting the upper two solid lines downward to the level at which all present values are equalized (at age fourteen). For purposes of discounting, the lowest income path was extrapolated back to age fourteen, the middle one to age nineteen. The use of income rather than earnings figures may bias the slopes upward; abstraction from similar trends in education and earnings may impart a counteracting bias. The procedure is clearly to be viewed as groping for some orders of magnitude rather than as estimating in any more rigorous sense of the word. Some doubts about the meaningfulness of the findings for occupational groups presented in Figure 5 are raised by the heterogeneity of these broad occupational groups. In each such group income dispersion might be largely a product of concealed interoccupational income differences among more detailed and homogeneous occupations included 33For comparable information about intraoccupational income dispersion for various dates, places, and definitions see ibid., Table 111 p. 87. 34 Ibid., and passim. in the broad classification. The problem may be rephrased in the following terms: Does the hypothesized relation between occupational rank and intra-occupational dispersion, which seems to exist in broad occupational groups, also hold true for more detailed occupations? An attempt to answer such a question involves breaking down the broad occupational groups into more detailed component occupations and studying their income distributions. Fortunately, a recent census monograph breaks down the large groups into 118 more detailed occupations and gives income distributions and measures of income dispersion for each of the component groups.35 The data are suitable for our purposes, since they separate wage and salary incomes of full-period36 workers from those of all workers.
Using income shares of top quintiles of workers in each detailed occupation as a measure of intra-group inequality, we can examine the existence of a relation between such inequality and the occupational rank of the groups. One way of doing this is to inquire whether most detailed occupations in the "top" broad groups (professional, managerial) tend to have larger quintile shares than occupations in the intermediate groups, and so on. Table 3 indicates a positive answer in terms of median shares and mid-ranges of shares for component occupations within the broad groups. Thus 36 Persons working 50 weeks or more in 1949. 35 Miller, op. cit., Table C -5, pp. 193-96. when the shares of top quintiles are arrayed in order of increasing size for the 28 subgroups of "craftsmen and foremen," the median quintile share is 30.2, and the 14 central subgroups have quintile shares running from 28.0 to 31.4 per cent of the aggregate income of the subgroup. As is seen, the medians follow the occupational rank. However, the wide mid-range for clerical workers deprives the median of that group of much significance, since it indicates an absence of central tendency. Table C -5, pp. 193-96. f Weeks worked, as defined in the 1950 Population Census includes all weeks in 1949 during which any work was performed. Persons who did any amount of work during each of 50 weeks in 1949 were counted as full-year workers. The variation in man-hours due to the sizable proportion of part-time workers in many occupations obscures the relation we are studying. No direct information is available on the extent of part-time work in the detailed occupations. Frequency distributions of earnings provided in Miller, op. cit., Table C-2, pp. 179-81, were used to exclude 12 occupations in which more than 10 per cent of workers earned less than $1,000, working 50 weeks or more in 1949. Such low earnings in groups of male, non-farm, full-period workers can only be a reflection of parttime work or of income received to a large extent in a non-monetary form. The excluded occupations are: clergymen; musicians and music teachers; messengers; newsboys; attendants; private household workers; charmen; janitors and porters; service workers (n.e.c.); fishermen and oystermen; lumbermen, raftsmen, and woodchoppers; laborers in wood production; and laborers in wholesale and retail trade.
An alternative approach to the study of the relation between occupational rank and income inequality in detailed occupational groups is to rank these groups independently instead of fitting them into the broad ranks, as in Table 3 Many other factors, compensatory or not, influence these levels, especially in the short run, and more so when small differences in levels are distinguished.
Yet, despite the impossibility of identifying and eliminating all such disturbing factors from the data, when this procedure was followed, a positive correlation coefficient of r = +0.77 was obtained.37 "Occupational rank," in our 37 After excluding the twelve occupations listed in the note to Table 3. sense, is a factor that cannot be dismissed in studies of income inequality within component population groups.
MIXED COMPONENT GROUPS
When the aggregate income distribution is broken down by any criterion other than occupation or age, it yields component groups which generally differ in occupational composition and age distribution. When such differences in composition are pronounced, the findings that the more highly trained'workers are characterized by both higher income levels and greater income inequality can be utilized to predict the rank order of income inequalities of the component groups.
Let each component group consist of several occupational strata. It can be shown that inequality in a component group is a "weighted" sum of the inequalities within strata, with "weights" reflecting the relative sizes and relative income levels of the strata.38 Therefore, the larger the proportion39 of "top" occupational strata, such as professionals and managers, in a group, the larger the income dispersion in the group. Geometrically speaking, a greater weight attached to upper occupational groups extends the right-hand tail of the income distribution of the occupation-mix.
DISTRIBUTIONS BY INDUSTRY
When the distribution of wages and salaries is disaggregated by industrial origin, the component distributions of earnings must, to some extent, reflect differences in the occupational compositions of the various industries. Such differences exist, no matter what boundaries are imposed on the concept of industry. When members of the labor force are classified by color, sex, family status, or city size, the resulting groups exhibit pronounced differences in occupational and age characteristics. As before, differences in the training-mix produce predictable patterns of income inequality.
Roughly speaking, the greater the average amount of training in the group, the greater the inequality in its income distribution.
Thus earnings of full-year employed non-white workers show less inequality than those of similar white workers; 42 These contained over 90 per cent of all male wage and salary workers. The exclusion of sixteen industries from the correlation is the result of a crude, but conservative, attempt to eliminate partperiod workers from the distributions: industries with over 20 per cent of workers receiving less than $1,000 during the year were excluded as being too strongly affected by the part-period income variable. These were agriculture, forestry, fisheries, lumber and wood, printing and publishing, foodstores, five and ten cent stores, gasoline service stations, drugstores, eating and drinking places, retail florists, private households, hotels and lodgings, dress and shoe repair, theaters and motion pictures, and miscellaneous entertainment. Intra-occupational differences arise when the concept of investment in human capital is extended to include experience on the job. Age measures both the process of acquiring experience and biological growth and decline. The growth of experience and hence of pro-44 The same explanation holds for the systematic increase in income levels with city size, which is a more familiar phenomenon. The increase in income level with city size is more apparent in the statistics that do not separate full-period from part-period workers. The greater proportion of part-period workers in smaller communities accentuates the differences in income levels, while it obscures the differences in income variances. 45 In this connection, recall the statement of Allyn Young to the effect that it is not income inequality but skewness that is a symptom of the distortion (in a normative sense) of the income scheme of society (Allyn Young, "Do the Statistics of the Concentration of Wealth in the United States Mean What They Are Commonly Assumed To Mean?" Journal of the American Statistical Association, March, 1917, pp. 471-84) .
